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Predicting Protection X 
Fox's Model 
Pox's phenomenological conception of intrinsic value includes the states Mhcing, 
relational, and hierarchical aspects that can he ""lbscrvcd in the previously discussed 
theoretical approaches to intrinsic value. Fox's model is a state·of-bcing model in that life 
and sentience, as inherent states of being, arc included as a basis for intrinsic value. 
Fox's model is relational in the sense that the ecosystem is considered intrinsically 
valuable by virtue of its systemic or relational nature. Fox's model is hierarchical in the 
sense that each of the state-of-being and relational-value approaches is successively more 
inclusive. Thus, Fox's model includes many of the clements that arc central to the 
theoretical debate. 
The approaches to value that Fox (1995) uses are labelled by the attributes, 
qualities, or states of being that may form the basis of an ethic that has intrinsic value as 
its foundation. The four approaches are; awareness-based ethics, biological ethics (life-
based ethics), ecosystem ethics, and cosmic purpose ethics (Fox, 1995). 
For the present study, two approaches arc of interest. They arc awareness-based 
ethics, and ecosystem-ethics. An awareness-based ethic holds that sentient entities 
should get, or arc deserving of, moral consideration because they arc sentient. Thus. an 
awareness-based ethic represents a state-of-being valuation. An ecosystem ethic 
represents a relational value approach to valuation. An ecosystem-ethic presumes that 
entities get, or are deserving of, moral consideration because of their value in an 
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I would allocate the wetland to the Marsh Dodder species because ......... . 
I would allocate the wetland to the Human species because ......... . 
On balance, how will you allocate the wetland? 
Exclusively for the 
Human species 
About me ..... 
54321012345 
female I male 
Predicting Protection 88 
Exclusively for the 
Marsh Dodder species 
18-24, 25-31, 32-38, 39-45, 46-52, 53-59, 60> years old 
Years of Education Received 
10 orless, II, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 +, years of education. 
Cultural identity 
Australian, Asian, British, European, New Zealand, other '----' 
No Faith, Otristian, Muslim, Buddhist, other L_ _____ _,. 
Vegetarian 
Vegetarian I Non-vegetarian 
How mi'Ch do you think that the Marsh Dodder species needs the wetland? 
No need at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Very great need 
How much do you think that Humans need the wetland? 
Noneedatall 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Verygreatneed 
Tbankyou very much for completing this questionnaire 





















